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In the period 1996-2000 Catalan convergence with the EU most 
dynamic regions has blocked, attending to Eurostat Regional data. In 
this paper, with the aim to analyze how can Catalonia converge with 
t h e  E U  i n  t h e  n e x t  y e a r s ,  i t  h a s  been proceeded to estimate some 
simulations of Catalan GDP growth in the 2010 horizon, considering 
different reduction scenarios of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish 
State (between 7-9% of Catalan yearly GDP). Looking at the obtained 
results, current Catalan stagnation will remain in the next years, if 
Catalan fiscal deficit mentioned above remains. Thus, Catalonia only will 
converge with most dynamic EU regions if there’s a significant 
reduction, in the following years, of Catalan fiscal deficit with the 
Spanish State.  
 
 
a Centre d’Anàlisi Econòmica i de les Polítiques Socials 
Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques 
Universitat de Barcelona 
Avinguda Diagonal 690, 08034 – Barcelona  
Phone: + 34.93.402.43.33 
Fax: + 34.93.402.19.37 
e-mail: jpons@ub.edu; rtremosa@ub.edu 
http://www.ub.es/eps  
 
* Corresponding author. 
Authors give thanks for the financial support received from SEC2002-
03212 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología). 
1 1.- Introduction 
 
 
In the last years Catalonia has stopped being the most dynamic 
Autonomous Community (AC) in the Spanish State. Catalan economy, 
which was traditionally considered the “factory of Spain” in the 19th 
and 20th centuries, observes how at the beginning of the new century 
tourism and construction replace industry and services in Catalan 
productive structure. Thus, Navarra was at year 2000 the first Spanish 
AC, considering the percentage of employment occupied in highest 
value added manufacturing sectors. At the same year, Madrid was the 
first Spanish AC, attending to the percentage of employment occupied 
in intensive knowledge services (Eurostat, 2002). 
 
This fact can be attributed mainly, among other reasons, to 
globalisation impact on the Catalan economy (Vives, 2002) and to 
actual politic structure of Spanish State: the limited autonomy of 
Catalan government can’t hold up the continual fiscal deficit with the 
Spanish State and implies the non-existence of a real regulating 
Catalan power over economic activity. 
 
Considering the first reason mentioned before, it is important to 
notice that EU enlargement process implies that Catalan industry is 
beginning to lose some of most labor intensive manufacturing sectors. 
It has been estimated that the half of Catalan manufacturing sectors 
will be seriously concerned by the removal of multinational investment 
and production to EU candidate countries and other emerging countries 
(Gual, 2002). On the other hand, the non-existence of a real regulating 
Catalan autonomous power implies that regulated activity sectors move 
from Catalonia to Madrid. To be near of the real and effective policy 
maker, for instance, Catalan pharmaceutical industry is locating in 
Madrid, city which has been concentrating in the last yeas financial 
services and multinationals central offices.  
 
However, EU enlargement is not necessarily bad for Catalan 
economy. If it is true that from now on some multinational investment, 
which since 1986 have been choosing Catalonia, will locate in the 
emerging countries,  Catalan integration in the EU has been extremely 
positive for Catalan industry. Thus, as supplier of great industrial 
multinationals, in the last years have appeared in Catalonia thousands 
of little and medium size Catalan manufacturing enterprises. And even 
some of them, having increased their dimension, have become Catalan 
industrial multinational which invest abroad (Fontrodona and 
Hernàndez, 2002). In this way, 1999 was the first year in which Catalan 
industrial investment abroad was bigger than foreign industrial 
investment in Catalonia (Molina, 2002). Thus, European economic and 
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 monetary integration process would have specially benefited Catalan 
economy: from 1993 the convergence in interest rate (which remained 
at 15% during the period 1988-1993) and the peseta’s depreciation 
(which was artificially appreciated in that period) would principally 
benefited industrial and exporter Spanish regions as Catalonia. This 
benign monetary policy executed in Spain since 1994 would have had a 
significant unequal territorial effect (Tremosa and Pons, 2001), at the 
same time that would have been the main reason of spectacular growth 
of Catalan exports between 1994 and 1998
1 (Costa and Tremosa, 
2003). 
 
On the other hand, and in spite of Catalan autonomy, the 
centralism of Spanish State affects negatively Catalan economy. Fiscal 
policy is still concentrated in European States, and Catalonia is a “richer 
region” of a “poor country”: with a GDP per capita of 99% of EU GDP 
per capita average in 2000, similar regions in France are net receiver 
regions of EU funds and French State funds, while Catalonia is a net 
taxpayer in the EU and in the Spanish State. Thus, there are inter-
territorial redistribution policies of the Spanish State that affects 
specially Catalan economy, which has been continuously its main AC 
contributor. In this way, there’s a significant academic consensus in 
Spain, considering that fiscal imbalance of Catalonia with the Spanish 
State has supposed a systematic outlay of wealth estimated between 7-
9% of Catalan GDP in the last years (Castells et al., 2001). Spanish 
public investment in Catalonia has been, in the last fifty years, 
systematically lower than the Spanish average (Castells et al., 2002). 
  
In this paper, with the aim to analyse how can Catalonia converge 
with the most dynamic EU regions in the next years, it has been 
proceeded to estimate some simulations of Catalan GDP growth in the 
2010 horizon, considering different scenarios of reduction of Catalan 
fiscal deficit with the Spanish State. This paper is organized as follows: 
section two presents the evolution of Catalan economy in the last years, 
in Spanish and European context, presenting the main estimations of 
Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State. Section three describes the 
methodology that has been used, related to economic growth 
simulations. Section four presents the main results obtained and, 
finally, section five concludes.  
 
                                                 
1 Catalan industry is a clear example of the relationship between openness 
and productive specialization. Today in Catalan manufacturing play a leading 
part only four sectors: chemical, automobile, machinery and food, which 
represented in 2001 a 60% of total Catalan industrial production (while in 
1990 it was only a 32%). In the same period, Catalan ratio exports/GDP has 
grown from 17.5% to 43% between 1990 and 2001.  
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2.- Catalan Economy in Spain and in the EU 
 
 
2.1.- Catalonia in Spanish context 
 
 
Even though from the beginning of 20
th century exist academic 
research about Catalan fiscal with the Spanish State, it is not until the 
seventies that this deficit becomes important. Because of modernization 
and growing intervention of the Spanish State in economy (in 1982 
public expenditure/GDP was only 16%, in 1993 was about 48% and in 
2001 it was 43%), Catalan fiscal deficit has become really important, as 
it is shown in Tables 1.A and 1.B. Thus, in spite of Spanish 
decentralization process, until 2001 Central Government in Spain 
collected the 90% of all Spanish taxes, at the same time that public 
expenditure was relatively decentralized: of total Spanish public 
expenditure, in 1998 the 66% belong to Central Government, 21% to 
regional governments, AC, and 13% to local governments (Ministerio de 
Economía y Hacienda, 1999). In this way, 2001 Spanish financial AC 
reform has increased the share in the main Spanish taxes to 20%, 
eliminating slow and inefficient transfers from Central Government to 
regional and local governments. But with this reform it can not be said 
that regional and local governments will dispose of a significant higher 
volume of resources (they have only got financial autonomy).  
 
Thus, in Catalonia in 1998 the 84% of total taxes were collected 
by the Spanish Central Government (30.240 millions €), the 9% by the 
Catalan government (3.240 millions €) and the 7% by local 
governments (2.520 millions €). Catalan tributary pressure (total 
taxes/GDP) in 1998 reached 38%, being the EU average in that year a 
43%. In the other hand, in Catalonia public expenditure was executed 
by the Spanish Central Government (48%, 13.200 millions €), by the 
Catalan government (34%, 9.350 millions €) and by local governments 
(18%, 4.950 millions €). Catalan fiscal pressure (total public 
expenditure/GDP) in 1998 reached 28%, being the EU average in that 
year a 48% (Ros, Tremosa and Pons, 2001). We can conclude that 
Catalonia pays taxes as an European country but receives public 
expenditure as a South-American country and we can also say that 
Catalonia pays taxes as a social democratic  country but receives public 
expenditure as a liberal country. 
 
Tables 1.A and 1.B present the amount of Catalan fiscal deficit (as 
the difference between all taxes paid by Catalonia and all public 
expenditure and investment received i n  C a t a l o n i a )  w i t h  t h e  S p a n i s h  




Catalan Fiscal Deficit with the Spanish State 
(Fiscal Deficit in current million euros) 
 
Year %  GDP  DEFICIT 
1986 7.5  2,722.6 
1987 8.0  3,269.5 
1988 7.3  3,359.6 
1989 8.9  4,687.9 
1990 8.8  5,180.7 
1991 8.9  5,745.7 
1992 7.5  5,198.8 
1993 4.5  3,185.4 
1994 6.0  4,627.8 
1995 5.6  4,693.9 
1996 6.3  5,607.4 
1997 8.1  7,723.0 
1998 7.8  7,969.4 
Sources: 1986-1994, Colldeforns and Martínez (1999);  





Catalan Fiscal Deficit with the Spanish State 
(Fiscal Deficit in current million euros) 
 
Year %  GDP  DEFICIT 
1995  0.9 700.6 
1996  2.2 1,871.2 
1997  4.9 4,390.0 
1998  5.4 5,194.0 
1999  7.7 8,032.9 
2000  8.8 10,035.4 
2001  8.9 10,746.4 
Source: Alcaide and Alcaide (2002). 
Note: Catalan GDP data is not exactly the same that provides IDESCAT. 
 
 
As a result of this fiscal deficit with the Spanish State, Catalonia 
presents in the Spanish context a slow but persistent drop trend: if 
Spanish GDP per capita average is equal to 100, in 2000 Catalan GDP 
per capita was 121.9 (FUNCAS, 2001), when it was 122.8 in 1998 and 
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 124.2 in 1985 (and it was 128.5 in 1975 and 160.7 in 1955). Thus, in 
2001 Catalan GDP reached its historical minimum, when represented 
only the 18.6% of Spanish GDP. This percentage coincides with the 
emergence of Madrid economy in the Spanish context, with a weight of 
17.4% of Spanish GDP in 2001, when in 1995 it was only a 16% (and 
Catalan GDP weight in Spanish GDP in 1995 was a 19.5%)
2. In this 
sense, Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State supposes a growing 
opportunity cost for Catalan economy, more especially as it is not 
growing as it could (and as are growing the most dynamic EU regions). 
Thus, Catalan GDP would have been in 2000 a 31.3% bigger than it 
was (152,867 millions € instead of 116,413 millions €) if all the amount 
of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State would have been 
invested in public capital in Catalonia (Ros, Tremosa and Pons, 2003).   
 
However, this continued flow of fiscal deficit not only limits 
Catalan possibility of growing. It also has an special incidence in the 
personal income of Catalans. In this sense, the analysis of this variable 
provided by the Spanish Foundation FUNCAS (2001) for Spanish AC 
shows which is the impact of the successive flows of Catalan fiscal 
deficit with the Spanish State. Adjusted in purchasing power parity, 
Catalan personal income drops from second position in 1985 (value 
117.5, if Spanish average is 100) to seventh position in 2000 (104.3). 
In this year Catalonia is surpassed by Navarra (121.8), Balearic Islands 
(121.5), Madrid (116.2), La Rioja (115.4), Aragon (113.2) and Castile-
Leon (109.0).  
 
 
2.2.- Catalonia in the European context 
 
 
In the European Union context the last available report of 
economic convergence at regional level is provided by Eurostat and is 
referred to year 2000 (Eurostat, 2003). However, Eurostat awards to 
Spanish GDP per capita the value 82, if EU GDP per capita average is 
100. It is important to notice that Spanish GDP per capita presents a 
poor convergence with the EU GDP per capita average, considering that 
in 1991 Spanish GDP per capita was a 78% of EU average. We consider 
that the cause of this weak result is the redistributive public policy of 
the Spanish State (Sala-i-Martín, 1997), which has systematically 
decided to invest attending to solidarity criteria (investing principally in 
the AC in which the GDP per capita is lower) instead of investing 
attending economic efficiency criteria (investing in the AC in which ratio 
public capital/ private capital is lower). This second case is the situation 
                                                 
2 Data available at www.ine.es, Spanish Statistic Institute. 
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 of Catalonia, in which every monetary unit invested could generate a 
greater multiplicator effect on GDP (the greatest in Spain).  
 
Table 2 presents the evolution of GDP per capita indexes of most 
dynamics Spanish AC, in purchasing power standard, between 1996 
and 2000, in which it is confirmed the convergent evolution of Madrid, 
Basque Country and Navarra, while Catalonia blocks. It is important to 
notice that the Basque Country and Navarra enjoy a self-sufficient 
financial agreement with the Spanish State (“concierto económico”), by 
which all taxes are collected by both autonomous governments; in fact, 
these two AC are financially independents, and they only satisfy to 
Central government the amounts equivalent to the services that it 
provides. In the case of Madrid, this AC represents only the 1% of 
Spanish surface, but in 1998 already concentrates 10% of Spanish 
public capital stock (FBBVA, 2002): all Spanish transport infrastructure, 
as the high velocity trains for instance, are radially designed from 
Madrid and only Madrid airport is the unique Spanish inter-continental 
airport (when Milan, Frankfurt, Hamburg or Munich offers several inter-
continental flights).   
 
 
Table 2.  
Regional GDP per capita in the EU and candidate countries  
In PPS (Purchasing Power Standard) 
EU-15 average = 100 
 
 1996  2000 
Madrid  101 110 
Navarra  98 105 
Basque Country  92 101 
Catalonia  99 99 
Source: Eurostat (1999, 2003).  
 
 
Comparing Catalan fiscal imbalance with the Spanish State in the 
European context, it is important to notice that only Italian regions of 
Lombardy and Emiglia Romagna presents similar percentages of 
regional GDP, in contributing to its Central Government (Castells, 
1998). However, these two Italian regions had in 2000 a bigger GDP 
per capita than Catalonia, 136 and 130, respectively (Eurostat, 2003). 
Thus, Catalan fiscal deficit of 1997 (8.1% of 1997 Catalan GDP) was 
considerably bigger than other contributors regions as Bayern (3.5%), 
Baden-Württemberg (4.,4%), Îlle-de-France (4.4%), South East (6.7%) 
and Stockholm (7.6%). International comparison emphasizes and 
accentuates Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State.  
7 
 Thereby, a Bank of Spain working paper (Desmet and Ortuño, 
2001) concludes that less developed Italian regions don’t have 
incentives to improve and grow, while public transfers from the Italian 
Government still continue. The authors call this behavior as “rational 
underdevelopment” and affirm that while the subventions arrive less 
developed Italian regions won’t have incentives to converge.  
 
  
3.- Methodology and statistic information 
 
 
3.1.- Previous considerations  
 
 
In economic literature there have been described different 
techniques to quantify the impact public expenditure programs. Thus, 
Nordhaus (2002) quantifies economic cost for the United States of Irak 
war. Abadie and Gardeazábal (2001) study the terrorism impact on 
Basque Country economy and Sosvilla and Herce (1998 and 1999) 
study the EU cohesion funds on Spanish economy.  
 
In all this research it has been used an autoregressive vectors 
model because its flexibility, because it is available enough information 
volume to build this kind of models, and because this methodology has 
been usually used in different countries to elaborate similar research. 
Thus, it can be mentioned the works of Roca and Pereira (1998) for the 
Spanish economy, Blanchard and Perotti (1999) for the United States 
and, finally, Mittnik and Neumann (2001) for Canada, France, Great 
Britain, Japan, Netherlands and Germany. 
 
At the end of eighties appeared in economic literature some works 
that analyzed the significance of public infrastructures on the 
productivity of countries and regions. The majority of these works have 
calculated the elasticity of product to public capital, by through a 
production function (which normally was a Cobb-Douglas). In spite of 
this, the works that obtain this elasticity mentioned above have 
received some methodological critical. One of the main limitations is 
that there can be observed feedback effects between the considered 
variables, which can be important. It means that it can exist a 
simultaneous relationship between production growth and public capital 
growth.  
 
To overcome this limitation in economic literature it is proposed to 
use techniques of multiequational time series (VAR models), which 
incorporate GDP, employment, private capital and public capital. These 
models allow catching relationships between these variables in a period 
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 of time, by through impulse-response functions. Dynamic feedback 
effects are essential to catch the relationship between public capital and 
the rest of the variables included in the model, more especially because 
it allows to consider how public capital affects GDP, employment and 
private capital. However, it is also possible to catch how these variables 
affect public capital growth, in a process which retro feeds it.  
 
 
3.2.- Statistic information  
 
 
In this paper it has been used the following variables: GDP at 
constant prices, employment, private capital and public capital. Statistic 
information refers to Catalan economy for the period 1965-1999. 
Information about GDP and employment come from Renta Nacional de 
España y su distribución provincial published by Fundación BBVA. 
Moreover, information about private and public capital come from El 
stock de capital en España y sus comunidades autónomas, also 
published by Fundación BBVA. In this last case, values of private and 
public capital of Catalan economy have been extrapolated for 1999 
starting on the values of these variables for Spain.  
 
This is a time serie not excessively long, and also information 
about production and employment are provided in biannual format. 
Even so, applied works metioned above referred to Spanish economy 
also present this limitation and use similar time series. Finally, it is 
important to notice that, being estimated the VAR model, it has been 
calculated some economic growth simulations of Catalan economy, 
having used IDESCAT (Catalan Statistic Institute) time series of Catalan 




3.3.- VAR model specification 
 
 
This econometric methodology demands stationary time series. 
To study considered variables stationariety it has been used unit roots 
tests, as it is common in literature. The results obtained confirm that 
original time series, expressed in logarithms, are stationaries in first 
differences. Thus, econometric analysis has been done considering first 
differences of the four variables mentioned above. Moreover, using 
Johansen test it is not possible to reject that the four time series used 
present a co integration relation. Even so, it is important to consider 
                                                 
3 This statistic informatcion of Catalan economy comes from IDESCAT website: 
http://www.idescat.es. 
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 with care the results of both test (stationarity and co integration), 
because the sample is not so big.  
 





t p t p t t t u X A X A X A X + ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − − − ... 2 2 1 1 µ  
 
 
in which vector Xt includes the four variables considered in this analysis, 
all of them expressed in logarithms and in first differences: gross 
domestic product (GDP), employment (OCU), private capital (KPRI) and 
public capital (KPUB). Moreover, Ai  (i=1,2,…p) are the parameters 
matrix that it is desirable to estimate, µ is a deterministic components 
vector, p is the model VAR order and, finally, ut is the residual vector. 
Thus, considering the four variables in logarithms and in first 
differences, we are making use of growth rate of the time series 
mentioned above.  
 
In the VAR model specification it is precise to select the 
deterministic components (constant and trend), and also the order of 
the model. The use of Akaike’s AIC and Schwartz’s SBIC criteria   
suggest that the VAR model order is p=1 and that, at the same time, it 
is necessary to incorporate in the model a constant and a trend, as its 
deterministic components.  
 
The analysis of the effects of a public capital growth, as a result of 
a reduction of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State, is founded in 
the impulse-response functions associated to the VAR model. These 
functions pick up the effect, on all the variables included in the model, 
of one variable variation (in or case, public capital). Moreover, these 
functions also allow to obtain the long term effect of a change in public 
capital in a determined moment. Definitively, by through impulse-
response functions, it is determined how Catalan GDP and employment 
will variate, if infrastructures investment increase and, simultaneously, 
how will be distributed this variation in the following years. 
 
Table 3 presents impulse-response functions for the four 
considered variables and for the five firsts years. It is important to 
notice that, because of the own VAR model definition, when it is 
imposed a change of an standard deviation in public capital in the year 
                                                 
4 Philisophy and statistics foundations of this kind of models can ben consulted 
in Greene (1998). 
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 t=1, the effects on the rest of the considered variables (GDP, 





Table 3.  
Impulse response functions 
 
Year GDP  EMP  KPRI  KPUB 
1  ---- ---- ----  0.0283 
2 0.0091 0.0051 0.0106 0.0177 
3 0.0034 0.0022 0.0110 0.0121 
4 0.0017 0.0007 0.0079 0.0072 
5 0.0005 0.0002 0.0051 0.0040 
Note: Changes when it is produced a variation of standard deviation in 
public capital.  
 
 
The results obtained in Table 3 allow us to know in which measure 
will change GDP, employment and private capital (in spite of this, the 
analysis will focus only on the two first variables), when it is produced 
an increase of 1.0% in public capital in the Catalan economy. Thus, an 
increase of 1.0% in public capital produces a cumulated variation in the 
following five years of 0.52% in the case of GDP and of 0.29% in the 
case of employment. In Table 4 it is shown which is the distribution, in 
five years, of this increase in percentage of GDP and employment. In 
this way, it is shown that the effects over GDP and employment of a 
1.0% in public capital increase is concentrated mainly in the second 





Temporary distribution of a GDP and employment increase  
 
Year GDP EMP 
1 ----  ---- 
2 61.7%  62.7% 
3 23.6%  27.3% 
4 11.7%  8.1% 
5 3.0%  1.9% 
TOTAL 100.0%  100.0% 
                                                 
5 It has been chosed t=5 as the late year of the impact, because of in the 




Moreover, there’s an alternative way to interpret these results. It 
can be considered which is the effect on Catalan GDP of an euro 
increase in public capital investment. Thus, an increase of one euro in 
public capital implicates, at the end of the following five years, a GDP 
increase of 1.43 €. The distribution of this result shows that in the 
second year the GDP increase is 0.84 €, in the third year the GDP 
increase is 0.34 €, in the fourth year the GDP increase is 0.17 €  and, 
finally, in the fifth year the GDP increase is 0.04 €. However, it is 
possible to use the same way to interpret these results can be used for 
employment: to create one job per year it is sufficient with a public 






Three scenarios of future Catalan economy evolution have been 
defined, based on projections of IDESCAT (Costa and Muñoz, 2001) and 
Spanish Ministerio de Economía. In table 5 are presented the annual 
growth, for every year of the period 2002-2010, for the different 




Catalan Economy Scenarios, 2002-2010 
Annual growth rate 
 
  INTERMEDIATE PESSIMISTIC OPTIMISTIC 
GDP   3.2%  1.5%  4.2% 
GDP Deflator  3.0%  2.0%  3.6% 
Employment 1.5%  0.5%  2.4% 
Nominal 
Productivity   4.7%  3.0%  5.4% 
Real Productivity  1.7%  1.0%  1.8% 
 
 
For every one of these three scenarios it has been quantified 
which would be in growth rate, for this period of nine years, nominal 
GDP and real GDP, GDP deflator and productivity for Catalan economy. 
In table 6 it is shown, for every scenario, which would be Catalan 
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 nominal and nominal GDP per capita in 2010. At the same time, these 





Catalan Nominal GDP  
 
  Nominal GDP 
(millions of euros) 
Nominal GDP per 
capita (euros)
 7 
Year 2001  125,444 19,713 
Year 2010    
Intermediate Scenario  216,628  32,728 
Pessimistic Scenario  170,867  25,814 




Probably, Catalan economy would reach a weak approach to most 
dynamic, developed European regions (in terms of GDP per capita, 
expressed in purchasing power standard), in the case of the optimistic 
scenario. A backward movement in the case of the pessimistic scenario 
and a maintenance, as it has observed in the period 1996-2000, in the 
case of the intermediate scenario (according to EUROSTAT, in 2000 
Catalan GDP per capita in PPS was a 99% of EU-15 GDP per capita 
average). In spite of this, if there were a significant reduction of 
Catalan fiscal deficit with Spanish State in the period 2002-2010, 
estimated VAR models in the preceding section show that at the end of 
2010, Catalan economy situation would be more favorable. This better 
position is observed in terms of GDP (table 7) and also in terms of 






                                                 
6  Contact the authors, if there is interest to deepen and comment these 
results, referred to the different analyzed years and also to the different 
considered scenarios. 
7 To obtain Catalan GDP per capita it has been supposed that Catalan 
population in 2010 will be of 6,619,035 people. This population has been 
obtained from the trend estimated for IDESCAT (Institut d’Estadística de 
Catalunya), and its population projections can be consulted in its web site 
(www.idescat.es). In 2001 information about Catalan population has been 
obtained from Spanish Statistic Institute (INE, www.ine.es), which confers to 
Catalonia in 2001 a population of 6,343,110 people. 
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 Table 7. 
Nominal GDP year 2010 and fiscal deficit reduction suppositions  
 
















216,628 237,925 286,184 342,889 
Pessimistic 
Scenario 
170,867 189,546 232,116 282,478 
Optimistic 
Scenario 
248,949 271,993 324,038 384,947 
Note: Amounts are expressed in millions of euros. In year 2001 Catalan  




Employment year 2010 and fiscal deficit reduction suppositions 
 
















2,827.4 2,999.4 3,372.6 3,788.1 
Pessimistic 
Scenario 
2,586.3 2,748.4 3,101.4 3,496.1 
Optimistic 
Scenario 
3,061.2 3,239.3 3,625.1 4,053.4 
Note: Amounts are expressed in thousands. In year 2001 Catalan 
employment was of 2,472.8 thousands. 
 
 
Thus, for instance, in the case of intermediate scenario, if in every 
year of the period 2002-2010 Catalan fiscal deficit with Spanish State 
would reduce in a 1% of Catalan GDP, in 2010 Catalan GDP per capita 
would be bigger in a 9.8%. If this reduction would be equivalent to 3% 
of Catalan GDP, in 2010 Catalan GDP per capita would be bigger in a 
32.1%. And finally, if this reduction would be equivalent to 5% of 
Catalan GDP, in 2010 Catalan GDP per capita would be bigger in a 
58.3%. 
 
Definitively, considering that without any reduction of Catalan 
fiscal deficit with the Spanish State and also that Catalan economy 
14 
 would grow at the intermediate scenario (and if this economic grow 
doesn’t defer of the EU-15 GDP growth average), Catalonia won’t 
converge with most dynamic EU regions in the next ten years. Catalonia 
only can reach an intense convergence if there’s a significant reduction 
of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State in the period 2002-2010, 
and if recovered flows are invested in public capital in Catalonia.   
 
Moreover, maintaining the suppositions mentioned before, if 
Catalan fiscal deficit reduction were equivalent to 1% of Catalan GDP 
(in the last years this deficit was estimated between 7%-9% of Catalan 
GDP), in 2010 Catalonia would place itself, if we consider EU-15 GDP 
per capita average=100, between values 108-112. If Catalan fiscal 
deficit reduction were equivalent to 3% of Catalan GDP, in 2010 
Catalan GDP per capita would place itself between 120-130. Finally, if 
Catalan fiscal deficit reduction were equivalent to 5% of Catalan GDP, 
in 2010 Catalan GDP per capita would place itself between 135-150.  
 
This bigger growth of Catalan economy, reached by through a 
reduction of Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State, would mean 
that Catalonia belong to the most dynamic group of European regions, 




 Table 9  
Catalan GDP per capita. Year 2010 
 
Yearly fiscal deficit 
reduction  
Without reduction  1%/GDP  3%/GDP  5%/GDP 











     
European Regions 





East Wales (98) 
Balears (98) 
Eastern Scotland (100) 
Basque Country (101) 
Umbria (101) 
Liguria (108) 
























     
Source: EUROSTAT and own calculation 
 
 
16 5.- Conclusion 
 
 
According to Eurostat Regional data, Catalan economy has blocked 
in the last years, while Madrid, Navarra and the Basque Country have 
converged vigorously with the EU Regional GDP per capita average (in 
2000 these three Spanish Autonomous Communities mentioned before 
surpassed clearly Catalonia: see Table 2). As the main reason of this 
stagnancy we suggest Catalan fiscal deficit with the Spanish State, 
estimated in the last years between 7 and 9% of Catalan GDP. Fiscal 
deficit doesn’t exist in Navarra and the Basque Country (because of their 
particularly financial system called concierto económico, that is 
equivalent an independent, self-sufficient  administration) and it is 
significantly lower in Madrid, clearly the most dynamic Spanish region in 
last years (only 1-2% of Madrid yearly GDP). Because of these 
continually extraction of Catalan resources and wealth Catalonia is losing 
economic growth opportunities in the EU context, and according to our 
estimates this stagnancy will continue in the next years if Catalan fiscal 
deficit with Spanish State still remains. Catalonia only will converge with 
most dynamic EU regions if there is, in the next years, a significant 
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